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Abstract
Conspiracist beliefs are widespread and potentially hazardous. A growing body of research
suggests that cognitive biases may play a role in endorsement of conspiracy theories. The
current research examines the novel hypothesis that individuals who are biased towards in-
ferring intentional explanations for ambiguous actions are more likely to endorse conspiracy
theories, which portray events as the exclusive product of intentional agency. Study 1 repli-
cated a previously observed relationship between conspiracist ideation and individual differ-
ences in anthropomorphisation. Studies 2 and 3 report a relationship between conspiracism
and inferences of intentionality for imagined ambiguous events. Additionally, Study 3 again
found conspiracist ideation to be predicted by individual differences in anthropomorphism.
Contrary to expectations, however, the relationship was not mediated by the intentionality
bias. The findings are discussed in terms of a domain-general intentionality bias making
conspiracy theories appear particularly plausible. Alternative explanations are suggested
for the association between conspiracism and anthropomorphism.
Introduction
Conspiracy theories, while not false by definition, are characteristically unverified, implausible,
and epistemically unsound [1]. Despite this, belief in conspiracy theories is widespread [2–7].
Moreover, conspiracy theories can have tangible consequences for believers, and for the wider
community. Conspiracy theories about HIV/AIDS and vaccines can influence health-related
behaviour [8–11], theories about anthropogenic climate change can influence attitudes towards
the environment [12], and theories about governmental malfeasance can foster radicalisation
and violence [13].
Until recently, conspiracism has been largely neglected by psychologists. However, a litera-
ture is now beginning to emerge pointing towards individual differences and cognitive factors
which may be associated with endorsement of conspiracy theories, including such variables as
agreeableness, authoritarianism, openness, mild paranoia, confirmation bias, the conjunction
fallacy, illusory pattern perception, the proportionality bias, and projection [3,5,14–24]. The
current research concerns a psychological factor which has yet to be explored in depth: attribu-
tions of intentionality. Conspiracy theories offer to explain complex and often ambiguous
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events in terms of intentional agency. This research is guided by the hypothesis that, to the ex-
tent that an individual tends to regard ambiguous events or situations generally as having been
intended, conspiracy theories may appear more plausible than alternative explanations.
(Over)attributing intent
Everyday social interaction depends on judgements of intentionality. This refers to the ability
to distinguish intentional actions and consequences from unintentional acts or outcomes, and
to infer the specific intentions motivating people’s actions. Judgements of intentionality are in-
tegral to understanding and participating in routine social interactions such as conversation
[25] and interpreting a particular individual’s behaviour over time [26,27], as well as under-
standing more abstract social enterprises such as theatre or literature [28,29]. Deficits in the
ability to comprehend the mental states of others can lead to difficulties in everyday life [26].
Given the importance of inferring the intentions of others, it is not surprising that the
cognitive system is keenly attuned to intentionality cues. The ability to perceive and infer inten-
tionality appears to be driven by low-level, automatic processes which preferentially encode
intent-relevant details while disregarding intent-irrelevant actions [26,30–32]. The cognitive
architecture underlying the ability to discern intentionality begins development in early infancy
and appears to mature rapidly during early childhood [27,33,34]. By adulthood, most neuroty-
pical individuals share a common understanding of the concept of intentionality, even in lieu
of an explicit definition [35,36].
The fast and automatic operation of intentionality-seeking cognitive processes allows us to
quickly make inferences about the mental states of those around us—an important evolution-
ary adaptation [37]. However, as is the case with other low-level cognitive processes [38,39], in-
ferences of intentionality may be subject to biases and heuristics. Not only are we sensitive to
the intentions of others, but we may be overly sensitive, biased towards perceiving or inferring
intentionality even where such an attribution may not be warranted.
An adult who observes another person sneeze, for example, may be explicitly aware that the
action was unintended. However, research suggests that this awareness is only arrived at sec-
ondarily, through effortful application of the acquired knowledge that intentions are not the
only possible causes of actions [31,40–42]. In particular, Rosset [31] reports a series of studies
suggesting that the low-level processes governing attributions of intentionality initially inter-
pret all actions as intentional—even actions which are never performed intentionally, such as
catching a cold. Only after the initial automatic attribution of intentionality has been made can
higher-level cognitive processes evaluate and, if necessary, override this involuntary assump-
tion. Thus, Rosset found that judging an action to be unintentional requires more cognitive re-
sources, takes longer, and results in increased ease of recall compared to judging the same
action to be intentional. Rosset refers to this irresistible inclination towards intentional attribu-
tions as the intentionality bias.
It must be noted that one attempted replication of Rosset’s studies failed to produce the
same results [43]. However, the notion of an intrinsic intentionality bias is consistent with the
wider body of research suggesting that intentional explanations are often preferred over unin-
tentional or situational explanations, even when a more tenable unintentional explanation is
available. This is especially notable in children under the age of five, but the tendency persists
into adulthood [41,42,44–51]. Moreover, adults often readily attribute anthropomorphic inten-
tions to nonhuman animals, or inanimate objects and entities [41,52,53]. Even abstract two-di-
mensional shapes moving around a screen are often imbued with human-like characteristics
and intentions when they move in ways consistent with our expectations of intentional agency
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[54–56]. Attributions of intentional agency become particularly likely when processing is
rushed or disrupted by consumption of alcohol [40,41].
Intentionality and conspiracy theories
According to conspiracy theories, nothing happens by accident. Such theories invariably ex-
plain events in terms of intentional agency, portraying the postulated conspirators as preternat-
urally competent in their ability to plan and control events, and discounting the role of chance
or unintended consequences [1]. Research has yet to examine whether there are measurable in-
dividual differences in susceptibility to the intentionality bias—that is, whether some people
are habitually less able or inclined to override automatic attributions of intentionality. Yet it
seems reasonable to suggest that if some individuals are more susceptible to the intentionality
bias, they will tend to find conspiracy theories more plausible than their corresponding main-
stream explanations, which are generally more contingent on accidents and unintended
consequences.
Lending additional plausibility to the notion that biased attributions of intentionality may
play a role in the adoption of conspiracist beliefs, research suggests that other anomalous be-
liefs are more prevalent among people biased towards unwarranted inferences of intentionality
[37,52,57–60]. It is worth noting that belief in conspiracy theories correlates with anomalous
beliefs, such as belief in the paranormal, superstition, and New Age beliefs [24,61,62]. More-
over, the tendency to endorse statements postulating some form of supernatural intentionality
increases when participants are made to feel powerless [63–65]. Endorsement of conspiracy
theories has also been found to increase under conditions of diminished self-efficacy
[19,66,67].
To date, few studies have touched upon the speculation that conspiracist beliefs may be a
product, in part, of a bias towards attributing intentionality. Imhoff and Bruder [68] report
that people who indicated stronger beliefs in conspiracies in general were more likely to blame
a specific real-world disaster (the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant catastrophe) on
intentional misconduct, as opposed to chance. However, given the apparent monological na-
ture of conspiracist ideation [3], this correlation may simply represent a proclivity towards as-
suming ambiguous real-world events were caused by conspiracy, rather than being a product
of a more domain-general intentionality bias. Additionally, conspiracist ideation has been
found to correlate positively with individual differences in anthropomorphism [68,69].
In sum, there is good reason to suspect a link between conspiracist ideation and promiscu-
ous attributions of intentionality, although such a relationship remains to be demonstrated.
Moreover, it is possible that the observed relationship between conspiracism and anthropo-
morphism may be a result of promiscuous attributions of intent. The current studies examine
the hypothesis that individuals biased towards favouring intentional explanations for ambigu-
ous actions in general may see conspiratorial explanations, which paint events as the product
of powerful hidden agents’ intentions, as being more plausible than non-conspiracist
explanations.
Study 1: Individual Differences in Anthropomorphisation
Overattribution of intentionality is not limited to ambiguous actions performed by humans.
Nonhuman animals or inanimate objects and entities are often attributed human-like inten-
tionality [54–56,70,71]. This tendency is referred to as anthropomorphisation. Individuals dif-
fer in their proclivity to anthropomorphise, and these individual differences have been found
to influence more specific beliefs, including attributions of responsibility and blame, and feel-
ings of care and concern toward anthropomorphised entities [53]. Some findings indicate that
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religious beliefs are associated with anthropomorphism [59], suggesting that anomalous beliefs
about supernatural agents may appear especially plausible to those who generally see the world
as suffused with intentionality. Likewise, two studies have found evidence of a modest but reli-
able positive association between individual differences in anthropomorphism and conspiracist
ideation [68,69]. The current study aimed to replicate the relationship between conspiracist
ideation and anthropomorphism using a different measure of generic conspiracism.
Method
Ethics statement. The study was approved by the Goldsmiths, University of London,
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. All participants provided written, informed
consent.
Participants. Eighty-four undergraduate psychology students at two London-based uni-
versities completed the study. No reward was offered for taking part.
Design. A correlational design was employed. The variables of interest were individual dif-
ferences in conspiracist ideation and anthropomorphism.
Materials. Generic conspiracist beliefs (GCB) [72]. Several existing scales measure beliefs in
specific conspiracy theories (concerning, for example, the 9/11 attacks and the assassination of
John F. Kennedy). However, findings suggest that such beliefs are a product of more abstract
assumptions about how the world works (e.g. that governments routinely perpetrate covert
acts of terrorism against their own people) [72–74]. Measuring these 'generic' conspriacist be-
liefs has been shown to provide a valid assessment of individual differences in conspiracist ide-
ation [72]; thus, the GCB was selected as an appropriate scale for the present studies. The scale
consists of 15 items (e.g. “New and advanced technology which would harm current industry is
being suppressed”) rated on a 5-point scale (1: definitely not true; 2: probably not true; 3: not
sure / cannot decide; 4: probably true; 5: definitely true). A single overall conspiracism score
was calculated for each participant by averaging their responses to the 15 items. Cronbach’s
alpha for the scale was high (.90).
Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire (IDAQ) [75]. The IDAQ con-
sists of 15 items assessing the degree to which individuals tend to anthropomorphise nonhu-
man animals and inanimate objects (example item: “To what extent does a television set
experience emotions?”). Participants respond on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (“Not at
all”) to 10 (“Very much”). Internal reliability in the current study was high (.88).
Procedure. Students were approached to take part in research following lectures on unre-
lated topics. Volunteers were given printed questionnaire packs. The IDAQ was always pre-
sented before the GCB. The word ‘conspiracy’ was not mentioned in the information sheet
presented to participants prior to filling in the questionnaire. No time limit was given, though
participants were asked to work quickly, answering with their first instincts.
Results
Data screening and descriptives. Raw data are available S1 Dataset. No cases were miss-
ing data for more than one item. Mean GCB and IDAQ scores were calculated for each partici-
pant. One bivariate outlier was excluded from analyses (total valid N = 83).
GCB scores were approximately normally distributed. On the whole, participants demon-
strated modest scepticism towards conspiracist ideas (M = 2.43; SD = 0.76). IDAQ scores
showed slight positive skew (skewness = 0.70). Participants were generally somewhat disin-
clined to anthropomorphise, evident from a grand mean somewhat below the mid-point of the
scale (M = 3.33; SD = 1.39).
Conspiracist Ideation and Attributions of Intentionality
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Association between conspiracist ideation and anthropomorphisation. The correlation
between mean GCB scores and mean IDAQ scores was moderate and positive (r (81) = .39,
p<. 001). That is, people who endorsed generic conspiracist ideas more strongly tended also to
endorse anthropomorphic statements more strongly.
Discussion
The aim of the present study was to replicate previous research indicating a relationship be-
tween individual differences in anthropomorphisation and conspiracist ideation [68,69], using
an alternative measure of conspiracism. As expected, a modestly sized positive correlation was
found. The findings appear consistent with the idea that conspiracist ideation is associated
with promiscuous inferences of intentionality. However, it is unclear whether anthropomor-
phism reflects a general bias towards inferences of intentionality. Thus, Studies 2 and 3 exam-
ine the inter-relationships between conspiracism, anthropomorphism, and the intentionality
bias in more detail.
Study 2: Conspiracist Ideation and Inferences of Intentionality
Having observed a correlation between conspiracism and anthropomorphism, this next study
aimed to establish whether conspiracist ideation is related to a domain-general intentionality
bias. Previous research suggests that people high in conspiracist ideation are more likely to ex-
plain a real-world event as the result of intentional conspiratorial misconduct [68]. The current
study, however, presents the first examination of whether people high in conspiracist ideation
tend to prefer intentional attributions for ambiguous scenarios in general—that is, beyond the
context of conspiracy.
Method
Ethics statement. The study was approved by the Goldsmiths, University of London,
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. All participants provided written, informed
consent.
Participants. A sample of 102 first-year psychology undergraduate students (81 females
and 21 males) completed the questionnaire. The majority of participants were of British
(62.7%) or other European nationalities (27.5%). Participant age ranged from 18 to 44 years
(M = 21.0, SD = 5.2).
Design. A correlational design was employed. The variables of interest were individual dif-
ferences in conspiracist ideation, and inferences of intentionality.
Materials. Generic conspiracist beliefs (GCB). General conspiracist ideation was again as-
sessed using the GCB. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was high once again (.88).
Inferences of intentionality. To measure individual differences in bias towards inferences of
intentionality, a measure was adapted from previous research looking at the intentionality bias.
Rosset [31] created a list of 34 sentences, each describing an action that can be done either on
purpose or by accident. Through pretesting, Rosset ranked the statements in terms of the pro-
portion of participants who offered an intentional explanation for each. Some statements were
almost never interpreted as intentional, such as “She burnt the meal.” Some were almost always
given intentional explanations, such as “She averted her eyes.” Crucially, however, 12 sentences
were more ambiguous, with between 27% and 69% of participants offering intentional inter-
pretations. These 12 sentences were selected as test items for the current study (e.g. “He set the
house on fire”; “She kicked the dog”).
Following Rosset’s (Study 2) methodology, two example sentences were presented to famil-
iarise participants with the task requirements. Subsequently, each test sentence was presented
Conspiracist Ideation and Attributions of Intentionality
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together with a space in which participants were asked to write “a brief description of the
image that comes to mind when reading each sentence”. On turning the page after writing de-
scriptions for all 12 sentences, participants received additional instructions asking them to “Go
back to each of your responses and clarify whether the event you described was done on pur-
pose or by accident.” Participants were required to write the words ‘on purpose’ or ‘by accident’
after each of their descriptions on the previous page. This step was included in the hope of
avoiding subjectivity in the coding of descriptions in which the intentions of the actor may be
unclear. Rosset gives the example of the following response to the sentence “He dripped paint
on the canvas”: “I see a guy in overalls holding a paint brush and looking down at a large canvas
on the floor in a loft like building.”Here it is unclear whether the actor intended to drip the
paint or not. As per Rosset, participants were not asked for this clarification until after they had
completed the open-ended description phase of the task so as to avoid priming participants to
think of unintentional explanations which may not have otherwise come to mind.
Procedure. Undergraduate students were asked to take part in this research following a
lecture on an unrelated topic in return for course credit. The word ‘conspiracy’ was not men-
tioned in the information sheet given to participants prior to filling in the questionnaire. Two
versions of the questionnaire pack, with the order of intentionality items counterbalanced,
were randomly distributed. The intentionality measure was always presented before the GCB.
No time limit was given, though participants were asked to work quickly, answering with their
first instincts.
Results
Data screening. Raw data are available in S1 Dataset. Despite asking participants to clarify
whether their descriptions of the ambiguous actions were ‘on purpose’ or ‘by accident’ in the
hope of avoiding experimenter subjectivity, examination revealed some seemingly incongruous
responses. In some cases a participant’s description of an item suggested an action which was
unambiguously accidental, yet they indicated that the action was purposeful, or vice versa. For
example, one participant responded to the item “He set the house on fire” with the following
description: “I see a man standing outside a burning building holding a petrol can and laughing
maniacally.” This would appear to imply an incontrovertibly deliberate act of arson; however,
the participant rated the action as accidental.
Out of 1,224 (102 participants multiplied by 12 items each) items total, the lead author identi-
fied 30 contentious items (2.45%) such as these across 10 participants. These 30 items, as well as
15 randomly chosen uncontentious control items, were presented to an independent rater who
blindly coded each item as contentious or uncontentious. Of the 15 control items which the first
rater judged to be uncontentious, the second rater agreed for 13 items (86.7% agreement). Of the
30 items judged by rater 1 to be contentious, rater 2 judged 24 to be contentious (80% agree-
ment). An overall inter-rater reliability analysis using the Kappa statistic was performed to deter-
mine consistency between raters, revealing acceptable agreement (Kappa = 0.63; p<. 001).
Accordingly, the 24 items which both raters judged to be contentious were excluded from subse-
quent analyses. In addition to excluding individual ambiguous items, a participant’s data were
excluded entirely if more than one item was missing (n = 5) or contentious (n = 7). Four addi-
tional multivariate outliers were excluded from analyses (total valid N = 86).
Descriptive data. Individual intentionality scores were computed by summing the num-
ber of intentional explanations each participant offered across the 12 items. Where a partici-
pant had a missing or excluded item, their total was adjusted by dividing by 11 and then
multiplying by 12 to give a score equivalent to participants with complete data for all 12 items.
On the whole, participants tended to offer intentional attributions for significantly more than
Conspiracist Ideation and Attributions of Intentionality
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0124125 May 13, 2015 6 / 14
half (M = 7.47; SD = 1.52) of the 12 items (t (85) = 9.14, p<. 001, d = 0.99). The data were ap-
proximately normally distributed about the mean, with slight negative skew; scores ranged
from 4 to 10 (median = 7; skew = -.14).
In addition, a mean conspiracist ideation score was computed for each participant by aver-
aging their responses to the 15 GCB items. On the whole, participants demonstrated modest
conspiracist ideation; the overall mean score was 2.90 (SD = 0.64), close to the mid-point of the
scale. GCB scores were approximately normally distributed about the mean (range = 1.47 to
4.27; median = 2.97; skew = -.14).
Association between conspiracist ideation and intentional inferences. There was a
small but statistically significant positive correlation between GCB scores and the number of
intentional inferences participants offered (r (84) = .22, p<. 05); that is, participants who en-
dorsed generic conspiracist claims more strongly tended to offer slightly more intentional
interpretations.
Discussion
This study aimed to provide an initial test of the hypothesis that individuals who are more in-
clined to inferences of intentionality in general will view conspiracy theories more favourably.
The data were consistent with this hypothesis.
The study raises some issues concerning the operationalisation of individual differences in
intentionality inferences that future research using the current measure might take into consid-
eration. In particular, cases of apparent incongruence between the description a participant of-
fered for an item and their explicit rating of ‘on purpose’ or ‘by accident’ suggests that a small
minority of participants may not have interpreted the task instructions in the same way as
other participants. Ambiguous cases such as these may reflect differing interpretations of the
concept of intent. For instance, a pyromaniac may be deemed to not be legally responsible for
their actions by virtue of temporary insanity. As far as the current research is concerned,
though, the act was intentional: the actor intended to bring about the observed consequences
through their actions. Alternatively, some ambiguous responses may simply reflect misunder-
standing of the task. Of potential relevance is the fact that 8 of the 9 participants with ambigu-
ous responses indicated non-British nationality or non-Caucasian ethnicity. It is possible that
cultural or linguistic nuances affected some participants’ performance on the task. Another
possibility is that the apparent incongruence reflects misunderstanding on the part of the rater,
rather than the respondent; however, an independent rater was employed to minimise this pos-
sibility. Study 3 employed some slight procedural modifications with these issues in mind.
Study 3: Associations between Anthropomorphisation and
Intentional Inferences
Study 1 found a relationship between conspiracism and individual differences in anthropomor-
phism, and Study 2 found a relationship between conspiracism and individual differences in in-
tentionality bias. It seems plausible to suggest that anthropomorphism itself may be a product of
overattribution of intentionality. If that is the case, then anthropomorphism and biased inten-
tionality inferences should be positively related, and the association between anthropomorphism
and conspiracism ought to be mediated by biased inferences of intentionality. This final study
examined all three variables in conjunction, seeking to clarify the inter-relationships.
Method
Ethics statement. The study was approved by the Goldsmiths, University of London,
Department of Psychology Ethics Committee. All participants provided written, informed
Conspiracist Ideation and Attributions of Intentionality
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consent. (n.b. Ethical approval was granted for the collection of data from participants aged 16
years and older in Study 3. All participants under the age of 18 were school children visiting
Goldsmiths as part of a field trip, whose guardians provided the school with written consent to
take part in the trip; this was not collected by the researchers. Caretakers for the visit provided
verbal consent at the time of testing, and participants provided their written, informed consent.
This consent procedure was approved by the Goldsmiths, University of London, Department
of Psychology Ethics Committee.)
Participants. As Study 2 suggested that the ambiguous sentences task may be sensitive to
participants’ interpretation of the task instructions, the current study solicited data only from
participants whose first language was English. Eighty-six psychology students (74.4% female),
ranging from A-Level (55.8%) through to Postgraduate level (16.3%), completed the study.
Participants were aged between 16 and 58 years (M = 23.5, SD = 9.7), and the majority indicat-
ed British or Irish nationality (90.7%).
Design. A correlational design was employed. The variables of interest were individual dif-
ferences in conspiracist ideation, anthropomorphism, and intentional inferences.
Materials. Generic Conspiracist Beliefs scale. General conspiracist beliefs were again as-
sessed using the GCB. Cronbach’s alpha for the scale was high (α = .92).
Individual Differences in Anthropomorphism Questionnaire. The IDAQ was again used to
measure the degree to which individuals tend to anthropomorphise nonhuman animals and in-
animate objects. Internal reliability in the current study was high (α = .90).
Individual differences in intentional inferences. The 12 ambiguous sentences used in Study 2
to measure individual differences in bias towards intentional inferences were used again in the
current study. The general procedure and instructions remained the same. However, minor
modifications were made to reflect the web-based interface, and in an effort to avoid the prob-
lem of ambiguous responses encountered in Study 2.
An initial web-page presented the 12 sentences in randomised order. Each sentence was ac-
companied by a small text input field in which participants were asked to type a brief descrip-
tion of the image that came to mind when reading the sentence. On completing this phase of
the task, participants clicked a button to move on to a new page, which reiterated the 12 sen-
tences together with the descriptions the participant had entered for each. Participants were in-
structed, “We’re now going to remind you of the sentences you just read and the answers that
you provided. For each of the answers you gave, all we would like you to do is clarify whether
the event or action that you imagined was done on purpose or by accident.” To do so, partici-
pants selected the appropriate option from a list of options labelled ‘on purpose’ and ‘by acci-
dent’. Unlike in Study 2, in the current study a ‘not sure / cannot decide’ option was also
provided. This additional response option was included so that participants were not forced to
choose one of the former options if they felt unsure of their response, or of the task instruc-
tions. ‘Not sure’ responses were excluded from analyses, avoiding the potential introduction of
experimenter subjectivity in identifying or coding ambiguous items.
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their age, nationality, and whether En-
glish is their first language (data from non-native-English-speakers were discarded).
Procedure. The survey was administered via a computer-based interface. Some partici-
pants (approximately one-third of the sample) were tested in person as a group using universi-
ty computer facilities. The remaining participants were recruited using emailed volunteer
requests directed to current A-Level and Postgraduate psychology students, with participants
completing the study remotely by accessing the survey online. To avoid priming ideas of con-
spiracy theories, the word ‘conspiracy’ was not mentioned in the information sheet presented
to participants prior to filling in the questionnaire. No time limit was given, though partici-
pants were asked to work quickly, answering with their first instincts.
Conspiracist Ideation and Attributions of Intentionality
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Results
Data screening and descriptives. Raw data are available in S1 Dataset. No cases were
missing data for more than two items on the GCB, IDAQ, or intentional inferences measures;
thus, none were excluded. No multivariate outliers were identified.
A mean GCB score was calculated for each participant. Scores were approximately normally
distributed. On the whole, participants demonstrated slight scepticism towards conspiracist
ideas (M = 2.71, SD = 0.86).
In addition, a mean IDAQ score was calculated for each participant. Scores showed slight
positive skew (skewness = 0.42). Participants were generally somewhat disinclined to anthro-
pomorphise, evident from a grand mean slightly below the mid-point of the scale (M = 3.54,
SD = 1.55).
Finally, an intentionality score was calculated for each participant following the procedure
used in Study 2. Again, participants generally interpreted significantly more than half (M = 7.75,
SD = 2.41) of the ambiguous sentences as being intentional actions (t (85) = 6.70, p<. 001,
d = 0.72). The data were approximately normally distributed about the mean, with scores rang-
ing from 1 to 12.
Associations between conspiracist ideation, anthropomorphisation, and intentionality
inferences. To first investigate whether individual differences in anthropomorphisation and
intentionality bias were related (and thus whether the relationship between anthropomorphisa-
tion and conspiracism may be mediated by intentionality biases), the correlation between the
two was examined. There was no significant association between intentional inferences and an-
thropomorphism (r (84) = -.10, p = .37); participants who indicated higher levels of anthropo-
morphism were no more likely to interpret the ambiguous sentences as intentional. Given the
lack of association between anthropomorphism and the proposed mediator, no further media-
tion analysis was conducted.
To assess the role of anthropomorphism and intentionality attributions in predicting conspir-
acist ideation, a multiple regression analysis was conducted with anthropomorphism and inten-
tional inferences as predictors and GCB scores as the criterion. Overall, the model was significant
and explained a substantial amount of variance (F (2, 83) = 27.72, p<. 001, Adj. R2 = .39). Both
predictors contributed significantly to the model (see Table 1). The relationship between inten-
tional inferences and conspiracist ideation was positive and weak, while the relationship between
anthropomorphism and conspiracist ideation was positive and more substantial.
Discussion
In line with Study 1, as well as previous research [68,69], the tendency towards endorsing an-
thropomorphic statements predicted stronger conspiracist ideation. Consistent with the results
of Study 2, the number of intentional attributions participants made in response to ambiguous
sentences positively predicted their level of agreement with conspiracist statements. Contrary
to expectations, however, no association emerged between individual differences in anthropo-
morphism and biased intentionality inferences, suggesting that anthropomorphism cannot be
accounted for by individual differences in the intentionality bias. Rather, the two measures
Table 1. Results of multiple regression with intentional inferences and anthropomorphism predicting
conspiracist ideation.
Predictor β t p
Anthropomorphism .62 7.29 <. 001
Intentional inferences .19 2.22 <. 05
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0124125.t001
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appear to reflect conceptually distinct traits or processes. Neither is the relationship between
anthropomorphism and conspiracism mediated by biased intentionality inferences. Multiple
regression analysis suggested that both traits predict conspiracist ideation. The relationship be-
tween intentionality inferences and conspiracism was small, only verging on statistical signifi-
cance. However, the successful replication and comparable effect size to that observed in Study
2 suggest that the relationship is reliable. The relationship between anthropomorphism and
conspiracism was stronger. The magnitude of the relationship is consistent with previous re-
search [68,69], suggesting that this relationship is also reliable.
General Discussion
The current research was guided by the speculation that conspiracy theories, which paint
events almost exclusively as the product of the conspirators’ intentions, may appear more plau-
sible the more an individual is biased towards seeing intentionality as the primary cause of
events in the world in general [31,59,68]. The findings offer support for this idea, as well as
shedding light on previous findings concerning trait-anthropomorphism [68,69].
First, the findings indicate a small but reliable association between conspiracist ideation and
attributions of intentionality in response to imagined ambiguous actions, such as “She kicked
the dog.” Individuals who were more inclined to interpret ambiguous imagined actions as hav-
ing been intended were more likely to endorse generic conspiracist statements. Conversely, in-
dividuals more inclined to interpret ambiguous actions as accidental were more likely to reject
conspiracist ideas. While one previous study suggests that people high in conspiracist ideation
are more likely to offer an intentional conspiratorial explanation for an ambiguous event [68],
the current studies are the first to provide evidence that this may reflect a more general bias to-
wards interpreting all ambiguous events—even those with no conspiratorial implications—as
having been brought about intentionally.
Second, it was speculated that the previously observed relationship between trait-anthropo-
morphism and conspiracism [68,69] may be a product of the same bias towards inferences of
intentionality. Study 1 replicated the relationship between anthropomorphism and conspira-
cism, finding a similarly sized correlation as that observed in previous studies. However, Study
3 found no evidence of a relationship between anthropomorphism and biased inferences of in-
tentionality. Scores on both measures significantly predicted conspiracist ideation; no media-
tion was evident. Thus, the relationship between conspiracism and anthropomorphism cannot
be explained as a product of biased inferences of intentionality.
One potential explanation is that anthropomorphism reflects an individual’s broad attitude
towards the world and people’s place in it, as opposed to reflecting a low-level bias towards
overattributing intentionality. In other words, the intentionality bias measure may capture im-
mediate, intuitive responses to a novel event, whereas anthropomorphism may reflect a more
reasoned pre-existing attitude. The two appear to be distinct traits, which independently
predict conspiracism.
To speculate further about the relationship between conspiracism and anthropomorphism,
previous studies have found conspiracism to correlate with traits reflecting openness to unusu-
al ideas [24,22,76]. In particular, one study reports an association between conspiracism and
endorsement of New Age ideas [61]. There is some possible conceptual overlap between mea-
sures of New Age beliefs and anthropomorphism. The IDAQ [75], used in the current research,
asks “To what extent does the wind have intentions,” for example. Participants may interpret
this as reflecting the same sentiment as some New Age beliefs, such as “The whole cosmos is an
unbroken living whole. . .” [61]. Alternatively, anthropomorphism may represent ontological
confusions [77]—attributing ontological properties of one category (such as human
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characteristics) on to another category (such as nonhuman animals or entities)—which have
recently been shown to predict conspiracist ideation [78]. In this way, conspiracist ideation
may reflect the attribution of human motivations, such as greed and control, on to wider social,
political, or physical processes which give rise to conspiracy theories. Future research may ex-
amine anthropomorphism in conjunction with a variety of other beliefs or dispositions, such
as New Age beliefs and ontological confusion, in order to establish the inter-relationships be-
tween these belief systems.
This research was based on the speculation that a domain-general bias towards attributions
of intentionality causes conspiracy theories to be evaluated more positively. This seems a rea-
sonable proposal, given evidence that the intentionality bias is a low-level, intrinsic aspect of
the cognitive system [31,41,42]. However, the current research is correlational, and as such,
does not demonstrate this causal relationship. An alternative possibility is that believing that
the world is dominated by conspiracy primes an individual to evaluate any imagined scenario,
even outside the context of conspiracy, in terms of intentional agency. The current studies are
intended as a preliminary investigation of a novel hypothesis, and the findings appear to pro-
vide tentative support. However, it is up to future research to examine the effects in more detail.
In particular, research taking an experimental approach is required to establish the direction of
causality. Future research may seek to establish whether manipulating the intentionality bias,
perhaps via cognitive load [31,40,41], has a direct effect on endorsement of conspiracy
theories.
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